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ESSAY

The SEC, Administrative Usurpation,
and Insider Trading
A.C. Pritchard*
The history of insider trading law is a tale of administrative usurpation and
legislative acquiescence. Congress has never enacted a prohibition against
insider trading, much less defined it. Instead, the SEC has led in defining insider
trading, albeit without the formality of rulemaking, and subject to varying
degrees of oversight by the courts. The reason why lies in the deference that the
Supreme Court gave to the SEC in its formative years.
The roots of insider trading law are commonly traced to the SEC’s decision
in Cady, Roberts & Co. 1 Cady, Roberts was only made possible, however, by the
Supreme Court’s decisions in SEC v. Chenery Corp., its first brush with insider
trading under the federal securities laws. In Chenery I, Justice Felix Frankfurter,
writing for a slim majority, rebuffed the SEC’s attempt to impose a crude insider
trading ban in a reorganization proceeding of public utility holding company. 2
The alleged insider traders in Chenery I were managers of a holding company
who had acquired preferred stock during the course of the reorganization. 3 As
Justice Frankfurter characterized the SEC’s rule of decision, the managers “were
fiduciaries and hence under a ‘duty of fair dealing’ not to trade in the securities
of the corporation while plans for its reorganization were before the
Commission.” 4 The SEC rejected a plan put forward by the company that called
for the managers’ preferred stock to be converted into common stock. 5
The SEC’s invocation of “fiduciary” responsibility provoked a now wellknown lecture from Frankfurter on legal reasoning:
* Frances and George Skestos Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I wish to
acknowledge the generous support of the William W. Cook Endowment of the
University of Michigan.
1. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
2. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 89-90 (1943).
3. Id. at 81-82.
4. Id. at 85.
5. Id.
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[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further
inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary?
In what respect has he failed to discharge those obligations? And what are the
consequences of his deviation from duty? 6

The SEC had not answered these questions. The agency had not found that the
insiders “acted covertly or traded on inside knowledge” but nevertheless
concluded that they had violated “broad equitable principles” recognized in
earlier judicial decisions. 7 The SEC’s reliance on precedent meant that it could
also be constrained by those decisions. The SEC would not necessarily be bound
by judicial precedents, Frankfurter conceded, had the agency promulgated new
rules. 8 But having “professed to decide the case before it according to settled
judicial doctrines, its action must be judged by [those] standards . . . .” 9
Justice Frankfurter suggested a willingness to defer to the SEC’s “experience
and insight” but hinted that deference would require the SEC “promulgate[] a
general rule.” 10 This divided Frankfurter from his more liberal colleagues,
Justices Hugo Black, Frank Murphy, and Stanley Reed, who rejected “[t]he
intimation . . . that the Commission can act only through general formulae
rigidly adhered to.” 11 They argued that the SEC enjoyed “wide powers to evolve
policy standards, and this may well be done case by case . . . .” 12
On remand, the SEC responded by reaching the same result while
substituting a different rationale. When Chenery returned to the Court,
Frankfurter complained to Black:

6. Id. at 85-86.
7. Id. at 86-87.
8. Id. at 89 (“Congress certainly did not mean to preclude the formulation by the

Commission of standards expressing a more sensitive regard for what is right and what
is wrong than those prevalent at the time the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935 became law.”).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 92. Chief Justice Stone suggested a more explicit endorsement of rulemaking.
Handwritten Note from Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to Justice Felix Frankfurter
(undated) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Harvard Law School Library).
Frankfurter demurred:
I agree with you that had the SEC summarized their experience by putting the specific ruling
in the Chenery case into a generalized rule, a totally different situation would have been
created. But I thought it wiser to indicate that by innuendo rather than explicitly. To do the
latter might be read by the Commission as a broad hint from us to issue a regulation. Thereby
we would be stimulating new problems.

Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone (Jan. 23, 1943)
(on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Harvard Law School Library).
11. Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 99 (Black, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 100.
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[T]he Commission has decided this case ad hoc without any reference to
considerations that would govern it in the same case tomorrow. . . . The SEC is not
a Kadi sitting under a tree, dispensing judgment in each case, unrelated to general
considerations. 13

Unmoved by Frankfurter’s charge of lawlessness, Murphy, Black, and Reed
were now joined by new Justices Wiley Rutledge and Harold Burton to uphold
the SEC’s action. The Chenery II majority explicitly rejected Frankfurter’s
suggestion that the agency should proceed by rulemaking: “[T]he choice made
between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that
lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.” 14
A generation later, a newly activist SEC, under the leadership of Chairman
William Cary, exploited the policymaking freedom afforded by Chenery II when
it launched its modern campaign against insider trading under Rule 10b-5 in
Cady, Roberts. 15 The Commission had adopted Rule 10b-5 under its Section 10(b)
authority as a general antifraud prohibition, but neither the rule nor the statute
mentions insider trading. 16 Notwithstanding these omissions, the SEC found in
Cady, Roberts that a partner in a brokerage firm had violated Rule 10b-5 when he
shared non-public information with his firm, which traded on the information.
Cary set out a broad prohibition of insider trading:
[T]he obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the existence of a
relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone,
and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing. 17

These elements are conspicuously absent from the text of Rule 10b-5 and Section
10(b). Moreover, Congress did not anticipate such a prohibition when it adopted
Section 10(b). Congress was well aware of the problem of insider trading in 1934,
a topic highlighted at length by Ferdinand Pecora in the legislative hearings that
led to the passage of the Securities Exchange Act. 18 But Congress addressed the
issue, albeit in a somewhat mechanical way, in Section 16 of the Act. 19
13. Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Hugo Black (Dec. 23, 1946) (on file with

the Robert Jackson Collection, Library of Congress).

14. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
15. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
16. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), ch. 404, 48 Stat. 891 (codified as amended at

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2015)); 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2015).
17. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912 (footnote omitted).
18. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 77-78 (3d ed.
2003).
19. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 896 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p (2015)).
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Undeterred by the lack of textual support, Cary proclaimed that the
“elements [of § 10(b)] under the broad language of the anti-fraud
provisions . . . are not to be circumscribed by fine distinctions and rigid
classifications.” 20 The SEC would interpret the securities laws as needed to root
out information asymmetries in the secondary markets to protect “the buying
public . . . from the misuse of special information.” 21 Statutory literalism would
not be an impediment.
Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court would endorse Cary’s free-ranging
interpretive approach in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. 22 Capital Gains,
although turning on an interpretation of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 23
also gave the green light to the SEC to push the boundaries of its power generally
by validating an open-ended notion of fiduciary duty: “Congress intended the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to be construed like other securities legislation
‘enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds,’ not technically and restrictively, but
flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.” 24 Moreover, Capital Gains suggested
that the SEC could expand its power through agency and judicial interpretation
of existing statutes and regulations without cumbersome rulemaking or, still
more burdensome, seeking legislation. 25
After the validation of its interpretive approach in Capital Gains, the SEC
turned to the courts to pursue its campaign against insider trading. Four years
later, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the Second Circuit validated the SEC’s
expansive reading of Rule 10b-5. 26
The stakes had escalated when the Supreme Court reentered the fray in
Chiarella v. United States, 27a criminal case. But by that time the Court’s makeup
had changed from the heady days of Capital Gains, most notably with the
addition of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., who would write the restrictive decisions
in both Chiarella and Dirks v. SEC. 28 In Chiarella, Powell construed Cady, Roberts
and Texas Gulf Sulphur narrowly to fit into his common law framework. 29
Powell made an uneasy peace with Capital Gains, adopting its equitable notions
of fraud, but imposing a technical and restrictive approach to interpretation
20. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
21. Id. at 913.
22. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
23. 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (2015)).
24. Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 195 (quoting 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 382 (3d

ed. 1943)).

25. Id. at 199.
26. 401 F.2d 833, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
27. 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980).
28. 463 U.S. 646, 648 (1983).
29. See A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O’Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell’s Legacy for the

Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 18-19 (1998).
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rejected by that case. The result was a more limited insider trading prohibition
than the government would have liked. Conspicuously, Powell made no effort
to cabin Chenery II; despite the criminal context, he did not suggest that the lack
of a statutory basis or rulemaking was an impediment to creating an insider
trading prohibition. 30
The narrow construction of tipping liability in Dirks followed from the
principles Powell set down in Chiarella. The deception required by Rule 10b-5
arose from traditional standards of fiduciary duty, focused closely on selfdealing: “whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from
his disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to
stockholders.” 31 But as in Chiarella, Powell did not call for legislation or
rulemaking, thereby making the Court further complicit in the SEC’s
development of an insider trading prohibition under Rule 10b-5.
In United States v. Salman, the Court will once again build on the common
law of insider trading. 32 Salman is an easy case on the merits. The inference that
a tipper receives an indirect personal benefit when he passes information to his
brother, or (indirectly) his brother-in-law, as occurred in Salman, is a natural
one. Maher Kara thought of himself as his brother’s keeper; caring for him was
a benefit to Maher, as it would be for anyone in a loving family relationship. 33
But if the result in Salman is easy, the opinion will be a challenging one to write
if the Court wants to clarify the law of insider trading.
The Court has brought this drafting difficulty on itself, having denied
certiorari in the case that actually raised the critical issue: United States v.
Newman. 34 In Newman, the Second Circuit overturned the convictions of two
hedge fund managers who received material nonpublic information via an
extended tipping chain. Newman adopted a narrow definition of the “personal
benefit” required by Dirks to establish a breach of duty by the tipper. An
acquaintance between a tipper and tippee was not enough: there had to be “proof
of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange that is
objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary
or similarly valuable nature.” 35 The Government’s petition for certiorari in
Newman argued that the Second Circuit’s holding “cannot be reconciled with
30. He did suggest in private correspondence that legislation would be appropriate. See A.C.

31.
32.
33.
34.

35.

Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws,
52 DUKE L.J. 841, 934 (2003).
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662.
792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016).
See id. at 1092.
773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015). Newman had its own
limitations as a vehicle for Supreme Court review; the convictions in that case also
foundered on the defendants’ lack of knowledge of the personal benefit provided to the
tippers by their initial tippees. Id. at 454-55.
Id. at 452.
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Dirks, which did not require an ‘exchange’ to find liability for a gift of inside
information and did not impose amorphous standards for the relationships that
can support liability.” 36
The Government overreads Newman, divorcing it from its facts. The
relationships between the tippers and their initial tippees in Newman fell far
short of the familial relationship in Salman. More to the point, the Government
is clearly overstating the holding of Dirks. Dirks did not spell out the “standards
for the relationship that can support liability” for insider trading. Laying down
such standards was not necessary to decide the case: Dirks had no relationship
with Secrist, his insider source. Rather, the cautious Powell left the details of the
required relationship for future cases. Newman addressed that issue in a case that
called for its resolution. Salman does not. If the Court feels it should decide only
the case before it (a possibility, if the Court remains shorthanded without a
replacement for the late Justice Antonin Scalia), the contours of insider trading
doctrine will remain murky after Salman. Salman will go to jail, but little else
will be resolved.
In prior cases, however, the Court has not been satisfied to simply decide the
case before it. The Court’s best-known trilogy in the area—Chiarella, Dirks, and
United States v. O’Hagan 37—ranged widely in defining the law of insider trading.
In Chiarella and Dirks, Powell reframed the Rule 10b-5 insider trading
prohibition around his preferred common law architecture, attempting to
constrain overreaching by the SEC and DOJ. 38 After Powell’s departure, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s O’Hagan opinion exploited the openings in Powell’s
edifice to expand the insider trading prohibition. 39 (A common law approach
does allow room to maneuver if the Court is bent on expansion.) So Salman could
say something meaningful—either narrow or broad—if the Court decides to
assert itself. If the Court decides to tackle the personal benefit issue head on, what
should it do?
The appeal of the Government’s basic argument—that there should be no
qualifier on “gift” or “friend”—is that it offers a bright-line test. If you give
someone valuable information knowing they might trade on it, at a minimum
you have breached a duty of confidentiality. And since no one gives something
for nothing, the jury should presume there was a reciprocal benefit to the
tipper. 40 This version of the personal benefit test would be easy for a jury to
36. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 14, Newman, 136 S. Ct. 242 (No. 15-137) (quoting
37.
38.
39.
40.

Newman, 773 F.3d at 452).
521 U.S. 642 (1997).
See Pritchard, supra note 30, at 936-42.
See 521 U.S. at 642.
The Seventh Circuit has come close to presuming the intention to make a gift from the
fact of disclosure. See SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 633 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Absent some
legitimate reason for Ferrero’s disclosure . . . the inference that Ferrero’s disclosure was
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apply. 41 If the Court were to accept this argument, however, it would amount to
a sub silentio overruling of Dirks, which distinguished careless from self-serving
breaches. Notwithstanding the novelty of the argument, there surely would be
a few justices who would vote to close another “loophole” in the law of insider
trading, as the Court did in O’Hagan.
Justice Powell, the architect of Chiarella and Dirks, would be less apt to see
the space as a loophole. 42 Although he recognized he was making common law,
his approach was conservative. He was not pushing the boundaries of the
common law with his insider trading opinions, although he was far from
adhering religiously to established doctrine. Instead, he viewed his approach as
consistent with the established practices of ethical businessmen. 43
The main drawback of the government’s version of the personal benefit test
is that it would stress the scienter element of Rule 10b-5 by requiring juries to
make challenging determinations of fraudulent intent. In Dirks, Powell
developed the personal benefit standard—which goes to the question of duty—
to cabin insider trading to actual cases of fraud; self-enrichment is a prototypical
badge of fraud.
In devising the personal benefit standard, Powell also sought to protect the
distribution of information to the analyst community. 44 Presuming a gift from
the fact of disclosure would effectively undo Dirks and the space that Powell
sought to preserve for analysts. The SEC has gone a considerable distance toward
this result already with its enactment of Regulation FD, which prohibits
selective disclosure by public companies. 45 What the SEC has not done,
however, is adopt a rule making such disclosures (or their receipt) fraudulent, 46
which would expose violators to criminal enforcement. Bringing the weight of
criminal law to the fight against selective disclosure appears to be the DOJ’s goal
in its recent crackdown on insider trading involving expert networks. Indeed,

41.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

an improper gift of confidential corporate information is unassailable. After all, he did
not have to make any disclosure, so why tell Maio anything?”).
More importantly from the government’s perspective, this test would give the widest
possible scope to the insider trading ban under Rule 10b-5. Of course, there is another,
equally clear bright-line test that could apply: the requirement of an explicit quid pro
quo for the disclosure of the information. One assumes that the government would be
less pleased with that rule, despite its clarity.
Cf. Pritchard, supra note 29, at 32-34 (showing Powell’s rejection of the misappropriation
theory as inconsistent with Chiarella and Dirks).
See Pritchard, supra note 30 at 936 & n.585.
A.C. Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of Personal Benefit, 68 SMU L. REV. 857, 860-61 (2015).
17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-103 (2015).
Id. at § 243.102 (“No failure to make a public disclosure required solely by [Regulation FD]
shall be deemed to be violation of Rule 10b-5 . . . .”).
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the government pointed to Reg. FD as supporting the convictions in Newman. 47
Presuming selective disclosures are fraudulent would aggressively expand Rule
10b-5’s common law prohibition.
The criminal implications of a broader interpretation might give pause to
even the most enthusiastic proponents of market integrity. Some of the Justices
may worry that the government is criminalizing previously accepted market
behavior through a novel interpretation of Rule 10b-5 rather than seeking
legislation, or at least rulemaking. The theme of Salman’s brief in the Supreme
Court is that due process concerns regarding fair notice, bolstered by a dash of
separation of powers, counsel in favor of the Court’s adopting a narrow quid pro
quo standard for personal benefit. 48
Salman’s proposed standard would prohibit outright swaps of corporate
information for cash and little else. The implicit suggestion is that Congress
should fix the law if it thinks the narrow standard leaves too much space for
market abuse. Unfortunately for Salman, too much water has gone under the
bridge for the Court to now repudiate its role in developing Rule 10b-5’s
common law of insider trading. Even if the Court wanted to abdicate the space
in favor of Congress, Congress has at least ratified the idea of a common law
insider trading prohibition by enacting legislation in 1984 and 1988 ramping up
the penalties for insider trading. 49 For better or worse, the Court is likely stuck
managing the common law of insider trading under Rule 10b-5.
How should the Court deal with the ambiguities and hard questions raised
by that prohibition going forward? In my view, notwithstanding the bedrock
status of Chenery II in administrative law, the Court should not defer to the SEC
when it develops rules through adjudication if those rules carry potential
criminal consequences. The Court should follow Powell’s lead, as the Second
Circuit did in Newman, by interpreting Rule 10b-5’s insider trading prohibition
narrowly. The Court could say, consistent with both Dirks and Newman, that an
indirect personal benefit that a tipper receives from conferring a gift requires a
meaningfully close personal relationship with the beneficiary. After all, Rule
10b-5 is about fraud, not carelessness, 50 and a requirement of some substantial
emotional attachment for a gift to count as an indirect personal benefit would
go a long way toward shoring up the amorphous line between negligence and
scienter.
47. Petition for Rehearing & Rehearing En Banc at 21, United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d

438 (2d Cir. Jan. 23, 2015) (No. 13-1837(L)) (“[S]elective disclosure of earnings would be
unlawful under SEC Regulation FD . . . and a jury could infer that Newman and
Chiasson, as sophisticated securities professionals, knew that.”).
48. See generally Brief for Petitioner, Salman v. United States, No. 15-628 (U.S. May 6, 2016).
49. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102
Stat. 4677 (1988); Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264
(1984).
50. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).
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Construing unwritten prohibitions narrowly assuages fair notice concerns.
A requirement of a substantial personal relationship would also limit the
government’s ability to pursue merely negligent behavior. That worry is
particularly acute with respect to the SEC, which does not labor under the
criminal burden of proof. Moreover, the lower courts have been quite generous
in applying the elements of Rule 10b-5 to the SEC’s claims. That has created real
mischief when those generous precedents are applied in a criminal context, as
the Government sought to do in Newman. 51 Upholding Newman’s meaningful
personal relationship standard while affirming Salman’s conviction allows the
Court to take a middle course, constraining government overreach without
abandoning a common law approach. 52
Obtaining material information of dubious province, as the Newman
defendants did, is more of a gray area. If the SEC thinks a broad prohibition
limiting the use of confidential information is essential to the health of securities
markets, it should adopt such a rule, or better yet, ask Congress for legislation.
Other countries have adopted statutory prohibitions to police insider trading as
a form of market abuse rather than trying to cram a prohibition into the
confines of common law fraud. 53 Either rulemaking or legislation could spell
out the breadth of the insider trading prohibition explicitly, giving fair notice
to individuals participating in the securities markets. SEC sympathizers will
worry that a narrow decision in Salman would be met by legislative impasse in
Congress. Some wrongdoers would then escape the punishment they deserve.
But each miscreant who escapes justice will be lobbying fodder for the SEC if it
decides to ask Congress for legislation. Congress, not administrative agencies,
should take responsibility for enacting criminal prohibitions in a democracy
committed to the rule of law.

51. In a criminal case, the government must prove that the defendant’s breach is “willful,”

Securities and Exchange Act § 32, but the space between that standard and § 10(b)’s
scienter requirement is scant, and easy for a jury to lose track of in a case of criminal
securities fraud.
52. Few would doubt that helping one’s brother is an indirect personal benefit. There
remains the question of whether this standard is consistent with Newman’s formulation
of the test, which requires “an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents
at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.” Newman, 773 F.3d at
452. The Supreme Court is unlikely to worry much about this detail of the Second
Circuit’s opinion. In any event, is a brother’s gratitude “a potential gain of a . . . similarly
valuable nature”? Most people would not trade their sibling’s love for money.
53. See generally Edward Greene & Olivia Schmid, Duty-Free Insider Trading?, 2013 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 369 (discussing insider trading law in the United Kingdom and the European
Union).
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